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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 





Case No. 18219 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal action brought by the State of Utah 
against defendant-appellant, Mary Holloway and others, alleging 
that said defendants did unlawfully cause the death of another 
in violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-203 (1953 
as amended), second degree murder, a felony of the first degree. 
The defendant-appellant appeals the judgment and conviction 
rendered by the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge 
presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant seeks to have her conviction reversed based 
on the failure of the trial court to give the properly requested 
jury instructions on the lesser included offense of Manslaughter, 
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-205 (1953 as amended), or 
in the alternative, judgment to be entered for manslaughter. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The appellant, Mary Holloway, was charged with murder 
in the second degree for the death on March 15, 1981, of Samuel 
Taylor Beare, IV. Her trial was joined with that of Charles 
Creer, however the action of a third defendant, Thomas Garcia 
was not joined for trial. Garcia was ultimately convicted 
of Second Degree Murder in a separate trial. 
A jury trial was held in the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District, Salt Lake County, from September 28, 1981, 
to October 1, 1981, the Honorable Peter F. Leary presiding. 
At trial conflicting evidence was heard concerning the culpability 
of appellants Holloway and Creer, and of Mr. Garcia. Most 
testimony agreed that Mr. Garcia was chiefly responsible for 
the events of March 15th. 
The evidence at trial showed that a vehicle was observed 
in the area of East High School in the early morning hours 
of October 1, 1981, and that an individual or individuals were 
seen to be struggling with an unconscious individual. The 
evidence ultimately showed the unconscious individual 
to be the deceased, and that after the deceased was left in 
the area of East High School, the individual or individuals 
exited the area and were later stopped and a struggle ensued 
between Officer Ryan and Thomas Garcia who ultimately fled. 
The appellants, Holloway and Creer, were apprehended and later 
released. It was the impression of arresting officer Ryan 
that the appellants "were intoxicated or on something to impair 
-2-
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them physically" (T. at 6). The appellant Holloway, was at 
no time seen touching the body of the deceased or assisting 
in its movement from the car (T. at 11 and 24) and although 
at the time of his arrest Garcia was covered with blood, and 
his fingers were broken (T. at 211-222), no blood was observed 
on the person of appellant Holloway. (T. at 214) These physical 
facts conflicted with the testimony of Patrick Dumas who indicated 
that the appellant Holloway, said "Tonuny went crazy last night 
and killed Sam Beare" and paused and said "well really we all 
killed him". (emphasis supplied) 
The theory of the defense at trial was that the appellants, 
Garcia , and Beare had been drinking that evening and that 
an altercation ensued between Garcia and Beare, and that in 
the appellant's attempt to stop Beare from besting Garcia, that 
Beare was killed. The evidence showed that Beare had a blood 
alcohol content of .19% (T. at 208) and that a drug screen 
showed numerous controlled substances in his blood stream at 
the time of his death. (T. at 202-203) 
Due to the evidence and circumstances that mitigated 
appellant Holloway's culpability, counsel for appellant submitted 
a proposed Instruction on manslaughter (R. 110). Upon rejection 
of this instruction, counsel made a timely objection (R. 484). 
Whereupon the court submitted instead Instruction No. 27 to 
the jury (R. 29), directing that the verdict must be either 
guilty of criminal homicide, murder, second degree; or not 
guilty. No instruction was given as to any possible lesser 
included offense. After deliberating over eleven hours, the 
@ v~rdict of guilty (R. 52). Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE 
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF MANSLAUGHTER CONSTITUTED 
REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
It is appellant's contention that the trial judge in 
the instant case was legally obligated to instruct the jury 
1 
on the lesser included offense of manslaughter. The court's 
failure to so instruct is substantial and constitutes reversible 
error. 
Because the term 'homicide' "embraces every mode by 
2 
which the life of one person is taken by another" , it is clear 
that both second degree murder and manslaughter fit within 
the broad category of homicide. Appellant submits that manslaughter 
is merely a less severe degree of homicide than second degree 
murder, and thus is included therein. 
Support for this position is found in Farrow v. Smith, 
541 P.2d 1107, 1108 (Utah 1975) where the Utah Supreme Court 
cites Clown Horse v. State, 170 Neb. 336, 102 N.W. 2d 625 (1960), 
wherein that court stated: 
1. Counsel for appellant requested :in writing and took exception to the trial 
court's failure to give such requests to the jury, properly preserving this 
issue on appeal. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 51. State v. Erickson, 
Utah, 568 P.2d 750 (1977); State v. Bell, 563 P.2d 186 (1977); and State v. GleasO!h 
17 U.2d 150, 405 P.2d 793 (1965). Accord: Rules of Practice :in the District 
Courts, Rule 5.4 
2. 40 Am. Jur. Hanicide § 1. 
-4-
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. . . where the defendant was charged with murder 
in the s7co~d degree but convicted of manslaughter, 
the conviction was proper, and the crime of manslaughter 
was an included offense. 
Further support is found in State v. Williams, 636 P.2d 1092, 
1097 (Utah 1981) citing State v. Gandee, 587 P.2d 1064 (Utah 
1978). There the Court held that carrying a loaded firearm 
in a vehicle was not a lesser included offense of carrying 
a concealed dangerous weapon. In so doing, the court distinguished 
these crimes from that of homicide, "with the various lesser 
degrees thereof." 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 (1953 as amended) defines second 
degree murder as follows: 
Murder in the second degree.---(1) Criminal homicide 
constitutes murder in the second degree if the 
actor: 
(a) Intentnionally or knowingly causes the 
death of another; or 
(b) Intending to cause serious bodily injury 
to another, he commits an act clearly dangerous 
to human life that causes the death of another; 
or 
(c) Acting under circumstances evidencing 
a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly 
engaged in conduct which creates a grave risk of 
death to another and thereby causes the death of 
another; or 
(d) While in the commission, attempted commission, 
or innnediate flight from the connnission or attempted 
connnission of aggravated robbery, robbery, rape, 
forcible sodomy, or aggravated sexual assault, 
aggravated arson, arson, aggravated burglary, burglary 
aggravated kidnapping, or kidnapping, causes the 
death of another person other than a party. 
(2) Murder in the second degree is a felony of 
the first degree. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-205 (1953 as amended) defines manslaughter 
as follows: 
-5-
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Manslaughter.---(!) Criminal homicide constitutes 
manslaughter if the actor: 
(a) recklessly causes the death of another; 
or 
(b) Causes the death of another under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance 
for which there is a reasonable explanation or 
excuse; or 
(c) Causes the death of another under circumstances 
where the actor reasonably believes the circumstances 
provide a moral or legal justification or extenuation 
for his conduct although the conduct is not legally 
justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances. 
(2) Manslaughter is a felony of the second degree. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-205 (1953 as amended). 
The factor which distinguishes second degree murder 
from manslaughter is malice. The Supreme Court noted this 
in Farrowv. Smith, supra, wherein it stated: 
For many years the definition of second degree 
murder has been the unlawful killing of a human 
being with malice aforthought and that of manslaughter 
was the unlawful killing of a human being without 
malice. In our opinion the new criminal code has 
not changed those definitions. Id. at 1109, (the 
court was interpreting the above quoted statutes 
as they were set forth in the 1975 pocket supplement 
to the Utah Code.) 
The test given to determine if one offense is a lesser 
included offense of another is that found in the recently revised 
Utah Criminal Code. Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402(3) (1953 as amended) , 
provides in pertinent part: 
A defendant may be convicted of an offense included 
in the offense charged but may not be convicted 
of both the offense charged and the included offense. 
An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same 
or less than all the facts required to establish 
the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, 
conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the 
offense charged or an offense other"7i.& ca .i.a'111iWilliae 
therein; or / 
-6-
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(c) It is specifically ~esignated by a statute 
as a lesser included offense. 
The process by which such a determination is made was described 
in State v. Woolman, 84 Utah 23, 33 P.2d 640 (1934): 
The only way this matter may be determined is by 
discovering all of the elements required by the 
respective sections, comparing them and by a process 
of inclusion and exclusion, determine those common 
and those not common, and, if the greater offense 
includes all legal and factual elements, it may 
safely be said that the greater includes the lesser, 
if, however, the lesser offense requires the inclusion 
of some necessary element or elements in order 
to cover the completed offense, not so included 
in the greater offense, then it may be safely said 
that the lesser is not necessarily included in 
the greater. (33 P.2d at 645) 
Section 76-1-402(4) states: 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge 
the jury with respect to an included offense unless 
there is rational basis for a verdict acquitting 
the defendant of the offense charged and convicting 
him of the included offense. 
A proper reading of the above section demonstrates that 
where a rationalbasis for instructing on a lesser included 
offense exists, the court is obligated to charge the jury thereon. 
Appellant submitted sufficient evidence to require presentation 
of the Manslaughter instruction to the jury. Appellant requests 
that this Court "survey the evidence and inferences which admit 
3. This statute was recently intepreted in State v. Lloyd, Utah, 568 P. 2d 357 
(1977), and its canpanion case, State v. Cornish, Utah, 568 P.2d 360 (1977), 
wherein this court held that the Utah joyriding statute is a lesser included 
offense of theft of an operable noter vehicle. 
-7-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of rational deduction, to determine if there exists reasonable 
basis upon which a conviction of the lesser offense could rest." 
State v. Dougherty, 550 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1976). 4 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE HAS A RIGHT TO 
SUBMIT HIS THEORY OF THE CASE TO THE JURY IN 
THE INSTRUCTIONS. 
It has long been the law in the State of Utah, that 
an accused in a criminal case has the right to submit to the 
jury his theory of the case, and that such theory, when properly 
requested, should be given to the jury in the form of written 
instructions. State v. Stenbeck, 78 U. 350, 2 P.2d 1050 (1931). 
In Utah this right allows for the presentation of instructions 
on all defenses and theories, including lesser included offenses, 
when such are properly requested by the accused. State v. 
Gillian, 23 Utah 372, 374, 463 P.2d 811 (1970); State v. Mitcheson, 
Utah, 560 P.2d 1120 (1977). 
An accused may make the decision as a matter of trial 
strategy to go "for broke" and decline to request instructions 
on a lesser included offense if his theory of defense so dictates. 
State v. Mora, Utah, 558 P.2d 1335, 1337 (1977); State v. Gellaty, 
22 U.2d 149, 152 449 P.2d 993 (1969); State v. Valdez,79 U.2d 
426, 428, 432 P.2d 53 (1967); State v. Mitchell, 3 U.2d 70, 
278 P.2d 618 (1955). However, when the accused, as his theory 
4. Interpreting Utah Code Ann. §77-33-6 (1953 as amended), a precursor to 
§76-1-402. (See, also, State v. Gillian, 23 Utah 2d 372, 463 P.2d 811 (1970). 
-8-
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of the case, requests instructions on lesser included offenses 
and is willing to submit his guilt or innocence to the jury 
on that theory, the trial court as a general rule is duty bound 
to submit these alternatives to the trier of the fact. State 
v. Gillian, 23 U.2d 374, 375, 463 P.2d 811 (1970). 
When the theory of defense embraces an argument, in 
effect in mitigation, that he is guilty of not the crime as 
charged in the Information, but some lesser offense, the teachings 
of Gillian apply. On this point the Gillian court stated: 
One of the fundamental principles to the submission 
of issues to juries is that where the parties so 
request they are entitled to have instruction 
given on their theory of the case; and this includes 
on lesser offenses if any reasonable view of the 
evidence would support such a verdict. State v. 
Gillian, supra, 23 U.2d at 374. 
In Gillian this court pointed out the reasons for this 
rule and the instant case illustrates the soundness of such 
a rule. This court said it should not be the prerogative of 
the trial court to direct the jury as to what degree of crime 
they may find a defendant guilty or to direct them that they 
must find him not guilty if they do not find him guilty of 
the greater offense. To allow this permits the court to be 
a judge of the facts and to in effect direct a verdict on the 
lsser included offenses. Such a procedure violates the historical 
spirit as well as letter of our system of jury trial under 
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Unites States Constitution 
and Article I, Sections 10 and 12 of the Constitution of Utah. 
State v. Ferguson, 74 Utah 263, 279 P.2d 55 (1929) (Straup, 
J. concurring). See also United States v. Skinner, 437 F.2d 
164, 165 (5th Cir. 1971). 
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Both the Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme 
Court have declared as a matter of policy and procedural safeguard 
the right of a defendant to receive instructions on a lesser 
offense if such is supported by evidence or if there is some 
doubt as to elements of the greater offense. In State v. Mewhinney, 
42 Utah 498, 134 P. 632, the Utah Court stated: 
In passing this point we desire to say that 
a trial court should, in every case where there 
is any direct or inferential evidence with respect 
to the different degrees of murder, charge the 
jury with regard to all the degrees, and this rule 
should be followed where there may be any doubt 
with regard to whether the higher degree is established 
or not. This is contemplated by our statute which 
divides crimes into degrees and which requires 
the jury to find in the lesser degree in case of 
doubt. State v. Mewhinney, 42 Utah 498, 134 P. 
632, 639. 
In Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980), the United 
States Supreme Court held: 
While we have never held that a defendant 
is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction 
as a matter of due process, the nearly universal 
acceptance of the rule in both state and federal 
courts establishes the value to the defendant of 
this procedural safeguard. That safeguard would 
seem to be especially important in a case such 
as this. For when the evidence unquestionably 
establishes that the defendant is guilty of a serious, 
violent offense---but leaves some doubt with respect 
to an element that would justify conviction of 
a capital offense---the failure to give the jury 
the "third option" of convicting on a lesser included 
offense would seem inevitably to enahnce the risk 
of an unwarranted conviction. 
While this is not a capital case, neither does appellant rely 
solely on public policy, but also on case law and Utah statutes, 
supra. 
-10-
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In State v. Bartias, 91 Utah 574, 65 P.2d 1130 (1937), 
this court noted that the failure to give an instruction on 
lesser included offenses when requested " ... clashes with 
two fundamental rules of trial in criminal cases: It has the 
effect of the court weighing the evidence and, in effect, limiting 
the jury to a consideration of only part of the evidence (the 
defendants'): and it, in effect, casts upon the accused the 
burden of proving his innocence or justification." (65 P.2d 
at 1132). 
When the accused requests a lesser included instruction 
there should exist a prestimption that the requested instruction 
be given. 5 Such is the tenor of this court's discussions in 
the past. In State v. Hymas, 64 U. 285, 230 P.2d 349 (1924), 
it was stated: 
It is, however, always a delicate matter for a 
trial court to withhold from the jury the right 
to find the accused guilty of a lesser or included 
offense, and determine the question of the state 
of the evidence as a matter of law. That should 
be done only in very clear cases. (64 U.2 at 297). 
Accord: State v. Barkas, 91 U. 574, 580, 65 P.2d 
1130 (1937). [Emphasis Supplied] 
In recent years this court has endeavored to set specific 
guidelines providing for the submission of lesser included 
offenses when requested. 
5. This seems to be the feeling of the court in State v. Gillian, supra, 23 U. 2d 
at 376, wherein it said: 
The usual rule on an appeal in which the challenge is to the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, is that we 
review the record in the light favorable to the jury's verdict. 
However, in this situation where the question raised relates to 
the refusal to submit included offenses, it is our duty to survey 
the whole evidence and the inferences naturally to be deduced 
rherefrom to see whether there is any reasonable basis therein 
a conviction of the ].esser offenses. 
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The statutory necessity of instructing a jury on a lesser 
included offense was described in State v. Dougherty, supra. 
This court cited Lisby v. State, 83 Nev. 183, 414 P.2d 592 
(1966), which followed a provision similar to Utah Code Ann. 
§77-33-6 (1953). Describing the holding of the Nevada Court 
this court said: 
The Court discussed three situations in which the 
problem of lesser included offenses are frequently 
encountered. First, where there is evidence which 
would absolve the defendant from guilt of a greater 
offense, or degree, but would support a finding 
of guilt of a lesser offense, or degree; the instruction 
is mandatory. 
Second, where the evidence would not support a 
finding of guilty in the connnission of the lesser 
offense or degree. For example, the defendant 
denies any complicity in the crime charged, and 
thus lays no foundation for any intermediate verdict; 
or where the elements of the offenses differ, and 
some element essential to the lesser offense is 
either not proved or shown not to exist. This 
second situation renders an instruction on a lesser 
included offense erroneous, because it is not pertinent. 
Third, is an intermediate situation. One where 
the elements of the greater offense include all 
elements of the lesser offense; because, by its 
very nature, the greater offense could not have 
been connnitted without defendant having the intent 
in doing the acts, which constitute the lesser 
included offense. In such a situation instructions 
on the lesser included offense may be given, because 
all elements of the lesser offense have been given. 
However, such an instruction may properly be refused 
if the prosecution has met its burden of proof 
on the greater offense, and there is no evidence 
tending to reduce the greater offense. The court 
concluded by stating that if there be any evidence, 
however slight, on any reasonble theory of the 
case under which the defendant might be convicted 
-12-
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of a lesser included offense, the court must, if 
requested, give an appropriate instruction. 6 (550 P.2d at 176-177). 
The question that arises then when lesser included instructions 
are requested is: was there " ... any evidence, however slight, 
on any reasonable theory under which the defendant might be 
convicted of the lesser [and] included offense ... " of criminal 
trespass. State v. Dougherty, supra, at 177; State v. Bell, 
Utah, 563 P.2d 186, 188 (1977) (Justice Wilkins, concurring). 
If there was such evidence, then the instructions were properly 
requested and should have been submitted to the jury for consideration. 
POINT III 
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY THE REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION AND DENIAL OF THAT ENTITLED INSTRUCTION 
CONSTITUTED REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Appellant submits that substantial evidence was presented 
at trial in the instant case to which a reasonable view, based 
on appellant's theory of the case, would support presentation 
of the instruction for the lesser included offense. For example, 
appellant's testimony indicated that she did not participate 
in the confrontation between the victim and Tonnny Garcia (T. 
243-244). Appellant also indicated that everyone had been 
drinking heavily (T. 242). This testimony was substantiated 
by Officer Nelson who indicated that it was his "impression 
that they were intoxicated or on something to impair them physically." 
(T. 6- 7) . 
6. State v. ~erty, supra, has been followed in State v. Pierre, Utah 572 
P.2d 1338, 13~977), and State v. Bell, 563 P.2d 186, 188 (1977). 
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Besides appellant's own testimony, there was evidence 
that she did nothing with the body of the victim (T. 13), nor 
was there any blood on her person (T. 14). Also, the evidence 
showed that appellant was merely a passenger in the car (T. 
26). Further, there was absolutely no evidence introduced 
at trial to indicate that appellant aprticipated in the homicide. 
She was merely present. 
The above mentioned factors clearly justify the need 
for giving an instruction on the lesser included offense of 
manslaughter. It is at least reasonable to assume that the 
jury could have, as the triers of fact, found appellant to 
have been reckless, and thus within subsection (a) of the Manslaughter 
statute. 
A portion of the evidence relied on by appellant is 
her own testimony. However, this fact itself does not per 
se destroy its credibility. In State v. Larry Elliot and Harrison 
Clayton, Nos. 17350, 17351, 17358 (Utah, January 21, 1982) 
the Utah Supreme Court found that a defendant's testimony, 
when received, has the same status as any other evidence, and 
is to be considered by the jury, who can then decide its crediblity. 
This statement by the court has support in another recent 
case. In State v. Chestnut, 621 P.2d 1228, (Utah 1980) (original 
emphasis) the court, in discussing lesser included offenses, 
stated: 
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If there be any evidence, however slight, on any 
reasonable theory of the case, under which defendant 
might be convicted of a lesser included offense, 
the trial court must, if requested, give an appropriate 
instruction. (Id. at 1232). 
There is no question that in the instant case at least some 
evidence was introduced to require the requested instruction 
on manslaughter. The trial judge's failure to leave such a 
determination to the jury to decide constitutes reversible 
error, under both Chestnut and Elliot. 
It is also important to note that the facts introduced 
at trial vis-a-vis Tormny Garcia could reasonably support a 
manslaughter instruction on his part, regardless of the serious 
nature of the wounds. (See State v. Gaxiola, 550 P.2d 1298 
(Utah 1976). Since appellant is basically in a position of 
an accomplice, those facts, as applied to Garcia, should justify 
a manslaughter instruction as to appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits that sufficient evidence 
was introduced at trial to warrant an instruction on manslaughter. 
The trial judge's failure to so instruct constitutes reversible 
error and appellant requests this Court to so rule. 
DATED this ~ day of June, 1982. 
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